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COMMENTS
The "Attorney Mediator": Protection
Through Representation
I. Introduction
In recent years, there has been a tremendous growth in the area
of alternative dispute resolution.' Many disputants who would nor-
mally turn to the judicial system for a resolution of their conflicts2
are now settling their disputes outside the adjudicatory process." One
alternative that has shown exceptional growth is the field of
mediation.4
Mediation is "a process of conflict resolution in which a neutral
third party helps parties in dispute reach a voluntary agreement.",
The process offers many psychological and procedural advantages
that make it an attractive alternative to litigation.' There is, how-
ever, a growing understanding that mediation cannot be conducted
I. See generally Riskin, The Special Place of Mediation In Alternate Dispute Process-
ing, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 19 (1985). For a description of the range of alternatives, see Sander,
Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79, 111 (1976).
2. Three major concerns have led to the growth of alternate methods of resolving
disputes:
First, overcrowding, delay, and cost continue to plague the nation's court-
rooms. Second, many observers of legal processes believe that formal, adversary-
style adjudication is unappropriate in a variety of civil and criminal matters.
Third, citizens too often view courts as intimidating, unfair, and incapable of
yielding equitable outcomes.
McEwen & Mauman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME.
L. REV. 238, 238 (1981) [hereinafter Small Claims].
3. See Riskin, Toward New Standards For the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 ARIz.
L. REV. 329 (1984) [hereinafter New Standards].
4. See, e.g., Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 31 (1982)
("[Miediation programs have proliferated at a breathtaking rate in this country.").
5. Pirie, The Lawyer as Mediator: Professional Responsibility Problems or Profession
Problems?, 63 CAN. B. REV. 378, 382 (1985). "Mediation differs from arbitration in that a
mediator does not impose a decision upon the parties, but works with the parties to produce a
negotiated agreement which the parties will then embrace as their own." Chaykin, Mediator
Liability: A New Role For Fiduciary Duties?, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 731, 734 (1984).
6. See infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1988
in total disregard of established legal principles. In most mediations,
because there is a conflict, there will be legal issues involved. The
disputants, therefore, must have an understanding of their legal posi-
tions in order to deal fairly and knowledgeably with each other."
The need for an integration of the law into mediation requires
the participation of lawyers in the resolution process. 8 Some lawyers
have recognized this need and are already acting as mediators;
others are likely to follow.9 This Comment will analyze the duties
and obligations of attorneys acting as mediators. Specifically, it will
analyze the role of the "attorney-mediator;" the attorney who acts as
mediator when the disputants are not represented by independent
counsel. 10 Additionally, this Comment will propose a theory of liabil-
ity that will protect the parties to mediation while providing guid-
ance to attorneys who act as mediators.
II. Advantages and Growth of Mediation
The primary advantage of mediation is the-ability of the parties
to form their own agreement." The process is not restricted by rules
of procedure or decisions of substantive law that dominate the adver-
sary process. 2 The disputants sit down together and discuss their
conflict with the help of the mediator. They discuss their needs and
fears, vent personal feelings, and discuss any and all matters that
they consider to be relevant.'" With this education,' the disputants
gain a greater appreciation of the conflict. They can then examine
shared goals and values, areas of dispute, and possible third party
concerns.' 5 In the end, they form an agreement that is reduced to
contract form and signed by both parties.' 6
7. See infra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
9. Cf. Riskin, supra note 4, at 52 ("Plainly, there will be conservative forces impelling
lawyers, bar associates, and law schools to become involved in this growth activity.").
10. This Comment has adopted the term "attorney-mediator" to signify the dual roles of
attorney and mediator. When referring to mediations in which the parties are independently
represented, the better term for the attorney acting as a mediator might be the "independent
advisory attorney."
I1. See J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLV-
ING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 9-11 (1984) [hereinafter J. FOLBERG].
12. Id. at 10.
13. See Fuller, Mediation - Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 309
(1971) (The author refers to this as a "sounding out" process.).
14. See J. FOLBERG, supra note II, at 10 ("Mediation can educate the participants
about each other's needs. ... ).
15. For a brief discussion of a mediator's duty to the general public, see id. at 354.
16. For a discussion of a mediator's functions within the settlement process, see
Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Suskind, 6 VT. L.
REV. 85, 91-97 (1981).
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"The involvement of disputants in fashioning their own resolu-
tion rather than having one imposed on them is said to lead to
greater satisfaction with the resolution and a higher level of compli-
ance than with judicial decrees.' 1 7 Further, the process of mediation
"tends to diffuse hostilities by promoting cooperation," which
reduces "the likelihood that a legal battle will continue beyond the
mediation process."' 8 In fact, "the process of working out their own
resolution, albeit with the assistance of a third party, is said to im-
prove the parties' capacity to resolve future disputes without the
need for external intervention."' 9 Besides these psychological and
emotional advantages, mediation can also be faster and less expen-
sive than litigation. 0
Although its roots are in the field of labor disputes,' the advan-
tages of mediation have led to tremendous growth in other fields.
Today, mediation is used to resolve neighborhood grievances,2 2 envi-
ronmental issues23 and interpersonal disputes.24 In divorce cases, the
use of mediators is particularly popular.25 Thus, mediation is fast
becoming a respected and popular alternative to litigation.2 6
Ill. The Role of the Law in Mediation
As mediation has become an acceptable alternative, it has
drawn clients who normally would have availed themselves of the
adversary system. 27 Many of these clients are drawn by the flexibil-
ity that mediation provides. The parties are free to construct agree-
ments that fit their individual needs rather than have one judicially
17. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 92 (1985) [hereinafter
S. GOLDBERG]. See also Small Claims, supra note 2, at 239.
18. J. FOLBERG, supra note II, at 10.
19. S. GOLDBERG, supra note 17, at 92.
20. Id.
21. Id. See W. SUMKIN, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
(1971).
22. See generally J. GOLDMAN, ROUNDTABLE JUSTICE: CASE STUDIES IN CONFLICT RES-
OLUTION (1980) (discusses conflict resolution in a variety of community contexts).
23. See L. LAKE. ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION (1980); S. MERNITZ, MEDIATION OF EN-
VIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A SOURCEBOOK (1980); Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the
Accountability Problem, 6 VT, L. REV. 2 (1981); McCrory, Environmental Mediation - An-
other Piece for the Puzzle, 6 VT. L. REV. 49 (1981).
24. See Small Claims, supra note 2 (mediation as alternative to adjudication in con-
tested small claims cases).
25. See 0. COOGLER, STRUCTURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT (1978); R.
COULSON. FIGHTING FAIR (1983); Crouch, Divorce Mediation and Legal Ethics 16 FAM. L.Q.
219 (1982); Silberman, Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation, 16 FAM.
L.Q. 107 (1982).
26. Freedman, Protection of Confidentiality in the Mediation of Minor Disputes, II
CAP. U.L. REV. 181, 181 (1982).
27. New Standards. supra note 3, at 329.
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imposed upon them. There are, however, many risks if mediation
proceeds without an understanding of the established law.28 The pri-
mary goal of the mediation process is to agree upon a mutually fair
settlement.2 9 It is impossible to have such a "fair" agreement if the
parties have no understanding of their legal rights.30
The making of a mediation agreement can have important legal
consequences."' "Frequently, the mere making of an agreement de-
fers legal action."3 2 To avoid relinquishment of established legal
rights, the parties should understand their present legal position and
the legal consequences of signing the mediation agreement. A party's
initial satisfaction and commitment to an agreement may be seri-
ously undermined if he later finds out that legally enforceable rights
were neglected in the decision making process. Without legal advice,
the disputants will form their own opinions about their legal position.
They may overestimate, underestimate, or be oblivious to their
rights. In any event, mediating parties, without the advice of legal
counsel, will be negotiating from a "false standard" 3 and mutual
fairness will be sacrificed.
There is also the threat of overreaching within an "alegal"3' 4
mediation. If one party is a more skillful negotiator or has a stronger
personality, the less skilled party may succumb to these strengths
without strongly advocating his position." In this situation, knowl-
edge of available legal rights may put the disputants in more equita-
ble bargaining positions.3 This is not to say that principles of law
28. See id. at 330.
29. R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YEs 88-89 (1981); H. RAFFA, THE ART AND
SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 218, 236, 257 (1982). One code of conduct for mediators provides:
"The goal of negotiation and mediation is a settlement that is seen as fair and equitable by all
parties. The mediator's responsibility for the parties is to help them reach this kind of settle-
ment." See Colorado Council of Mediation Organizations, Code of Professional Conduct for
Mediators (Jan. 1982); Pirie, supra note 5, at 383.
30. See Pirie, supra note 5, at 380. "Many mediation theorists today contend that famil-
iarity with the applicable laws is a prerequisite to a mediator's competence." Note, The Sul-
tan's of Swap: Defining the Duties and Liabilities of American Mediators, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1876, 1889 n.52 (1986). "A prediction of the likely results of adversary processing is necessary
for an informed, full voluntary decision about a mediated solution. Riskin, supra note 4, at 37.
31. Riskin, supra note 4, at 35.
32. Id.; Comment, The Dilemma of Regulating Mediation, 22 Hous. L. REV. 841, 864
(1985).
33. Pirie, supra note 5, at 384.
34. J. FOLBERG, supra note II, at 244.
35. CP. New Standards, supra note 3, at 333 ("Each might in addition need protection
from the other side's maneuvers.").
36. "To reduce the danger that less powerful persons unwittingly will give up legal
rights that would be important to them, they must be afforded a way of thinking about the
nature of the adversary process and the result it would likely produce." Riskin, supra note 4,
at 35.
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will be determinative of the dispute.
[In determining what is mutually fair, law will only be a
relevant factor in the process. Law will not be an absolute stan-
dard for the parties. The parties may decide what the law says is
fair to both. But they may also legitimately decide what the law
says is unfair or only partially fair. Law is simply an indication-
of societal norms or values.87
The need for an understanding of legal principles necessitates
the participation of lawyers in the mediation process."' In addition to
restrictions upon the unauthorized practice of law by non-lawyers, s9
the attorney-mediator has legal expertise that can bestow several
benefits upon the disputants. 40  The attorney-mediator is better
equipped to identify underlying legal issues4 I and to incorporate the
parties' agreement into a final, legal contract.42 Overall, he can pro-
vide a thorough examination of the parties' respective legal positions
that allows them to deal knowledgeably and more fairly with each
other.
The ethical propriety of attorney-mediation, however, has been
challenged on many occasions. Some commentators43 and bar opin-
ionS44 have gone so far as to say that attorneys should not act as
37. Pirie, supra note 5, at 384.
38. Id. at 381.
39. In recent years, many commentators have been critical of the bar's strict restrictions
concerning the "unauthorized practice of law." See, e.g., Rhods, Policing the Professional
Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions,
24 STAN. L. REv. I (1981) (Author argues that such restrictions should only prevent non-
attorneys from arguing before court.).
One commentator has expressed the belief that lay persons with an expertise in a certain
area of law may provide better legal counseling. The restrictions on practicing law, therefore,
should be relaxed to allow competent advice to be provided cheaply and efficiently. Comment,
Assisting the Pro Se Litigant: Unauthorized Practice of Law or the Fulfillment of a Public
Need, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 691 (1983). Adoption of such a rule would enhance the media-
tion process, allowing experts from other disciplines to mediate conflicts involving their area of
expertise while providing guidance concerning relevant legal principles.
40. See New Standards, supra note 3, at 336.
41. This does not "mean to suggest that lawyers should dominate divorce mediation or
any other mediation actively or that it is always, or even usually, better to have a lawyer than
a non-lawyer mediator . . . . [M]ost lawyers are ill suited, by training and inclination, to the
mediator's role." Id. They are not trained in the fields of counseling or psychology which may
be invaluable in solving many disputes. However, "those lawyers who can serve in neutral
capacities in mediation and employ their legal skills offer a unique and valuable service to the
parties. ... Id. Therefore, the growth of attorney mediation will provide alternative types
of mediation for disputants. They can choose a mediator based on their evaluation of the na-
ture of the dispute.
42. See generally Comment, supra note 32, at 864 (legal enforceability of mediation
agreements).
43. See Chaykin, supra note 5, at 757; Crouch, supra note 25 (arguing that roles of
attorney and mediator are irreconcilable).
44. Letter from Leland Ripley, Staff Attorney, Washington State Bar Association to
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mediators. Most of this severe criticism has come from writers who
insist that a lawyer's only role in the legal field is to be adversarial."5
This is an overly narrow conception of an attorney's role. It should
be remembered that a title often conferred upon lawyers is that of
"counselor." The implications of this title should not be overlooked.
As Chief Justice Burger pointed out, it is a lawyer's historical and
traditional obligation to be "healers of human conflicts." '46 This
quote "emphasizes a need to acquire training in the skills necessary
to resolve disputes by means other than the adversary process. '
Mediation provides a unique opportunity for attorneys to use and
develop their "healing" abilities.
IV. Interpretations of the Model Rules
Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,48 "a lawyer
shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be
directly adverse to another client."' 9 The Rules provide an exception
to this obligation by permitting an attorney to represent adverse in-
terests when: "1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation
will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client, and 2)
each client consents after consultation. °5 0 The Model Rules have
also introduced the concept of the lawyer acting as an intermediary
between clients.5' In this role, the lawyer "seeks to reconcile [the
parties'] divergent interests as an advisor and, to a limited extent, as
[name obliterated] (Feb. 20, 1980); New Hampshire Bar Association Ethics Committee Opin-
ion (Mar. 16, 1982), 8 N.H.L.W. 385 (1982).
45. "Advising parties of their legal rights in the mediation context is a delicate process
because it mixes the attorney's role, which tends to be adversarial and representative, with the
role of the mediator, which is cooperative and nonadversarial." Chaykin, supra note 5, at 757.
46. W. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, Annual Report on the State of the Judici-
ary, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982).
47. Pirie, supra note 5, at 381 (discussing quote).
48. The Model Rules were adopted by the American Bar Association on August 2,
1983, to replace the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1979). MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter . . . . MODEL RULES]. This Comment relies on
the Model Rules because they "provide much more specific regulation of the lawyer as media-
tor." Pirie, supra note 5, at 391.
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility does not contain a disciplinary rule that
directly addresses the ethical obligations of a mediator. The Code does, however, contain an
ethical consideration which states:
A lawyer is often asked to serve as an impartial arbitrator or mediator in
matters which invoke present or former clients. He may serve in either capacity
if he first discloses such present or former relationships. After a lawyer has un-
dertaken to act as an impartial arbitrator or mediator, he should not thereafter
represent in the dispute any of the parties involved.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-20 (1979).
49. MODEL RULES, supra note 48, Rule 1.7(a).
50. Id.
51. Id. Rule 2.2.
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a spokesman for each client." 52
Under these rules of professional conduct, it would appear that
an attorney is fully sanctioned to act as a mediator. The comment to
Rule 2.2, however, provides that "[t]he rule does not apply to a law-
yer acting as arbitrator or mediator between or among parties who
are not clients of the lawyer. . . ."' Thus, the primary ethical ob-
stacle to attorney mediation has been the concept of "representa-
tion." Bar ethics opinions" and commentators5" have struggled with
the concept of representation in an effort to determine the underly-
ing duties of an attorney-mediator. A Maryland State Bar opinion"
pointed out the critical difference between representation and media-
tion by noting that "an impartial . . . mediator is a different role
from that of an attorney representing a client. In the former situa-
tion, the attorney-client relationship would not necessarily exist and,
while honesty would remain a fundamental duty of the lawyer re-
gardless of the role, loyalty would not." '5 7
Several commentators" and bar opinions" have latched on to
this distinction as a method of bypassing the ethical obligations of
representation while facilitating the growth of attorney-mediation.
As one commentator stated, "This would free the lawyer from some
of the protective obligations associated with the concept of represen-
tation and the normal lawyer-client relationships, yet . . . permit
him to contribute most of the information and ideas that adversary
counsel would provide." '
Although this approach may be proper when there is indepen-
dent counsel and the legal rights of the parties are adequately pro-
tected, such a theory disregards the established notions of what con-
stitutes the "practice of law" and the public policy concerns
52. Id. Preamble.
53. Id. Rule 2.2 comment (emphasis added).
54. For a comprehensive survey of ethics opinions discussing the question of representa-
tion, see Crouch, supra note 25.
55. See New Standards, supra note 3; Comment, The Attorney as Mediator - Inherent
Conflict of Interest?, 32 UCLA L. REV. 986 (1985).
56. Maryland State Bar Association Committee on Ethics, Ethics Docket 80-55A (Aug.
20, 1980); reprinted in MD. ST. B.J. 8 (Jan. 1981) [hereinafter Maryland Op.].
57. Id. at 9. The Maryland Committee, however, felt that the lawyer-mediator who does
not have a lawyer-client relationship with the parties cannot give legal advice because he
would not have a duty of loyalty. Id. at 6.
58. See New Standards, supra note 3; Comment, supra note 55.
59. Committee of Professional Responsibility of the Boston Bar Association, Op. 78-1
(1978); Connecticut Bar Association, Journal Op. 36 (1982); Association of the Bar of the
City of New York Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 80-23 (9181) reprinted
in 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3097 (Oct. 13, 1981) [hereinafter New York City Bar Op.].
60. New Standard, supra note 3, at 345.
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underlying these notions. Therefore, a definition of the attorney-me-
diator's duties may be different when the disputants are not repre-
sented by independent counsel.
V. The Single "Attorney-Mediator" Situation
Several state ethics opinions have declared that an attorney act-
ing as a mediator does not represent the parties to the dispute.6' In
each case, however, they have done so with the caveat that the law-
yer "advise the parties of the advantages of seeking independent le-
gal counsel . "..."'I The rationale behind this requirement is that
independent legal counsel will "insure that each party has made in-
formed choices." 63 These opinions, however, have disregarded the re-
alities that in many situations will make further consultation impos-
sible.64 They have also overlooked the benefits to be gained in some
instances through the use of a single attorney-mediator. 65
Placing the responsibility on the parties for seeking independent
legal advice will undoubtedly lead to an increase in the time and
costs involved in resolving the dispute. The time and cost involved for
two extra lawyers to review all the legal issues would in many cases
"eliminate all time and cost advantages attributable to the mediation
process."6 Frequently, the parties to a dispute choose to participate
in mediation and forego adjudication based on a desire, and some-
times the need, to save time and money. 7 In such situations, the
parties are likely to disregard the warnings of the mediator and
forego the use of independent counsel. Additionally, the parties to a
mediation may not understand the necessity for independent counsel
and thus are likely to disregard the warnings of the mediator."
61. See supra note 59.
62. E.g., New York City Bar Op., supra note 59, at 3100.
63. Connecticut Bar Association, Journal Op. 35 at 2 (1982).
64. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
66. Pirie, supra note 5, at 400.
67. In State Bar v. Cramer, 399 Mich. 116, 249 N.W. 2d 1 (1976), the Supreme Court
of Michigan stated "that the cost of an attorney [private] prevents some people from obtaining
a divorce . . . they separate from their spouses without obtaining a divorce and later enter into
relationships which cannot be solemnized, frequently with serious economic and other conse-
quences." Id. at 141, 249 N.W.2d at 10 (Kavanaugh, concurring). The court noted, "[w]ith
the need for counseling and advice so overwhelming, lawyers are going to have to make greater
efforts and exercise more ingenuity in satisfying [the] need [for legal services]." However,
"[t]he courts must continue to use traditional means to protect the public against unprofes-
sional practice of the law." Id. at 139, 249 N.W.2d at 10 (Williams, concurring). The single
"attorney-mediator situation would be one way to satisfy the need while protecting the
public."
68. "The unsophisticated client, relying upon the confidential relationship with his law-
yer, may not be regarded as able to understand the ramifications of the conflict, however much
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Beyond these practical realities, which would result in the
mediatrants being unrepresented, there are substantial benefits to be
gained in some situations from the use of a single attorney-media-
tor.69 One such benefit relates to the ability to save time and money.
As previously noted, many people view the ability to save time and
money as one of the primary inducements to mediate. If the savings
available through mediation are diminished by the requirement of
outside counsel, many parties will be deterred from seeking the me-
diation services of a lawyer, 0 thereby foregoing all the benefits in-
volved."1 In cases where the parties realize their dispute is primarily
concerned with legal principles, they may be inclined to forego medi-
ation altogether or employ a lay-mediator who may not be able to
handle the mediation as competently. 2
A second benefit of using a single attorney-mediator is a reduc-
tion of the influence from the adversarial process.73 When the neu-
tral attorney-mediator provides legal advice, he will convey it in a
non-adversarial fashion by stating what a court hearing the dispute
might consider and the possible outcomes of litigation.7 ' On the
other hand, when independent counsel provides advice to the dispu-
tants, they are likely to state opinions that favor the rights of their
client. Instead of seeking an agreement that will be mutually benefi-
cial, disputants will bring to the mediation firm concepts of what
they believe they are entitled to in the agreement. 75 Though the par-
ties may still continue with the mediation, the quality of the process
may be irreparably damaged.76
Another advantage of the singe attorney-mediator is an en-
hanced perception of mediator neutrality. The requirement of inde-
pendent counsel:
explained to him." Kelly v. Greason, 23 N.Y.2d 368, 378, 244 N.E.2d 456, 462, 296 N.Y.S.2d
937 (1968).
69. New Standards, supra note 3, at 336.
70. See Pirie, supra note 5, at 400.
71. For a discussion of the benefits of simultaneous representation in other areas, see
Developments in the Law - Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1244, 1309-10 (1982) [hereinafter Developments].
72. See New Standards, supra note 3, at 336.
73. Id. at 335.
74. Id. at 336.
75. See id.
76. Id. Some of the uncertainties associated with using outside attorneys in mediation
were recounted in a Boston Bar Association ethics opinion. The opinion noted that "A separa-
tion agreement cannot really be evaluated by one who has not participated in the negotiations
leading to it and, therefore, cannot judge whether it appropriately reflects the views, needs,
strengths and weaknesses of each of the parties." Committee of Professional Responsibility of
the Boston Bar Association, Op. 78-1, at 4-5 (1978).
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challenges not the competency of the lawyer to give accurate
legal information, but rather the ability of the lawyer to do this
impartially . . . . [T]he rule sends a clear message to the par-
ties, and indeed even the mediator, that impartiality is impossi-
ble. The result can be that trust in the mediator, essential to the
mediation process and developed in large part due to a percep-
tion of mediator neutrality, will be jeopardized. Trust in the me-
diator will be replaced by trust in the independent legal advice."
Based on the foregoing considerations, it is apparent that at
times the parties involved in mediation will not or should not be rep-
resented by independent counsel. In such cases, the important ques-
tion that remains is whether the attorney-mediator "represents" the
disputants during the mediation process when the protection pro-
vided by independent counsel is no longer present.
VI. Defining Representation For Attorney-Mediators
The duty of "representation" arises when an attorney-client re-
lationship exists.78 The Model Rules assert that an attorney-client
relationship exists when "the client has requested the lawyer to
render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so." The Rules
also note, however, that "principles of substantive law external to
these rules determine whether a client-lawyer relationship exists."'7 9
It is well established that the existence of an attorney-client re-
lationship can be implied from the surrounding circumstances, espe-
cially when the client has requested an attorney's legal advice.8" As
one court noted, "It is sufficient for such a relationship that the ad-
vice or the assistance of an attorney is sought and is received in mat-
ters pertinent to his profession." 81 In the case of mediation, however,
the growing trend is to accept the fact that there is room for dispens-
77. Pirie, supra note 5, at 400-401.
78. R. MALLEN & V. LEviTT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 72 at 99 (1977) [hereinafter R.
MALLEN].
79. MODEL RULES, supra note 48, Scope.
80. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Machine Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass.
1950); Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966); Crest Invest-
ment Trust, Inc. v. Comstock, 23 Md. App. 280, 327 A.2d 891 (1974); Lawall v. Groman, 180
Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897); Nicholson v. Shockey, 192 Va. 270, 64 S.E.2d 813 (1951).
81. Crest Investment Trust, Inc. v. Comstock, 23 Md. App. 280, 295, 327 A.2d 891, 902
(1974). "Authority in other States also supports the rule that the relationship between attor-
ney and client may be implied from the conduct of the parties and does not depend, unless the
parties so specify, on the payment of a fee or the execution of a formal contract." Id. at 295,
327 A.2d at 902.
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ing legal advice without being burdened by the responsibilities of
representation.82 This exception to the established rule can work only
if the public policy reasons for implying the attorney-client relation-
ship are not applicable.
The primary reason for implying the attorney-client relationship
is to protect a party who might rely on the attorney's advice."3 In
fact, "[t]he single most important concern in [a] court's defining and
regulating the practice of law is the protection of the public from
incompetent, unethical or irresponsible representation."' 4 Innocent
parties may forego otherwise legally enforceable rights based on the
advice they receive from an attorney. Therefore, in the interest of
protecting such individuals, public policy dictates that attorneys who
provide legal advice have undertaken a duty to do so competently.86
Accordingly, the attorney-client relationship is implied to establish a
duty of care. The premise upon which this policy is based, however,
is that the party must be one likely to rely upon the advice received.
Therefore, a more accurate test for establishing the duty of care con-
siders 1) the reasonable belief of the client that he can rely upon this
advice; and 2) the likelihood that this client will rely upon the
advice.
A. The Reasonable Belief of the Client
In Westinghouse Electric v. Kerr-McGee Corporation,80 the
Seventh Circuit found the belief of the client to be determinative of
an attorney-client relationship.8 7 In this conflict of interest case,
Kerr-McGee sought to disqualify the law firm representing Westing-
house because the firm also worked for American Petroleum Insti-
tute (A.P.I.), of which Kerr-McGee and three other defendants were
82. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
83.
[I]f the giving of such [legal] advice and performance of such services
affect important rights of a person under the law, and if the reasonable protec-
tion of the rights and property of those advised and served requires that the
persons giving such advice possess legal skills and a knowledge of the law greater
than that possessed by the average citizen, then the giving of such advice and of
such services by one for another as a course of conduct constitutes the practice
of law.
The Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1191 (Fla. 1978).
84. The Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1980) (emphasis added).
85. "Even if the attorney gives gratuitous advice, he is held to the same standard of care
as if there were a formal retainer." R. MALLEN, supra note 78, § 72 at 100-101. See also Fort
Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Sleptoe and Johnson, 127 U.S. App. D.C. 93, 381 F.2d 261
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 946 (1968).
86. 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
87. id. at 1321.
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members. The firm's work for A.P.I. consisted of research and prep-
aration of testimony on divestiture legislation pending before Con-
gress. The district court held that the law firm's "involvement was
that of an expert consultant and researcher,"8 8 and, therefore, the
firm's conduct lacked sufficient "indicia" for an attorney-client rela-
tionship.89 On appeal the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the
existence of an attorney-client relationship "hinges upon the 1) cli-
ent's belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and 2) his
manifested intention to seek professional legal advice."90 Although
this test was supplied specifically for determining an attorney-client
relationship for the purposes of establishing the attorney-client privi-
lege, it provides, for the purposes of this Comment, an established
basis for testing the reasonable belief of the client.
It is reasonable to assume that clients will seek the services of
an attorney-mediator to receive pertinent legal advice concerning
their conflict. 1 Therefore, the second prong of the Seventh Circuit's
test is easily satisfied. Accordingly, the client's reasonable belief will
binge upon whether the mediator is acting as a lawyer.
In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation,2 the
court found that an attorney acts as a lawyer when the client gives
the attorney confidential information "for the purpose of securing
primarily either (i) an opinion of law or (ii) legal services or (iii)
assistance in some legal proceeding." '93 This definition was more
aptly applied in Zenith Radio Corporation v. Radio Corporation of
America9" in which the court found that legal advice consists of ap-
plying rules of law to the specific facts of the client's case.9" Thus,
according to this rule, an attorney will be acting as a lawyer, and a
client can reasonably rely upon the advice given, when the attorney
applies principles of law to the specific facts of the client's case. In
mediation, the attorney-mediator will undoubtedly be applying prin-
88. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1301 (N.D. 111.),
rev'd sub nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
89. Id.
90. 580 F.2d at 1319 (quoting C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 88 at 179
(2d ed. 1972)).
91. "[Rlegardless of how well the mediation process is explained to some disputants,
they will still think they are seeking a mediator who will give them legal advice." Comment,
supra note 32, at 846 n.40. Cf. New Standards, supra note 3, at 333-34 (discussing the need
for legal services in mediation and the resultant need for lawyers acting as mediators).
92. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
93. Id.
94. 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954).
95. Id. at 794.
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ciples of law to the issues surrounding the conflict.96 Ordinarily, the
parties provide the mediator with the relevant facts involved in their
dispute, and the mediator supplies legal advice based on the clients'
relative positions.
B. Likelihood of Reliance - Effect of Disclosures
In the usual attorney-client situation, the reasonable belief of
the client that he can rely upon the advice given is enough to estab-
lish the attorney-client relationship. 97 The likelihood of the client's
reliance on the advice requires that a duty of care be established.
The remaining consideration in the mediation setting is whether the
disputants are likely to rely on legal advice provided by the attorney-
mediator. If a likelihood of reliance is present, attorney-mediators
should be held to an appropriate standard of care to protect the in-
terest of the disputant parties.
In the single attorney-mediator setting, the likelihood of a party
relying upon the advice of the attorney is very high. The mediator
will be the only source of legal knowledge available, therefore, the
parties will normally rely on his characterization of their respective
legal positions. In such cases, public policy demands that the attor-
ney-mediator undertake a duty to do so competently. Therefore, in
the interest of protecting the parties to a mediation, the attorney-
client relationship should be implied.
In the attorney-mediator field, however, it is standard practice
for the mediator to advise the disputants to consult independent
counsel and, further, to inform them that he does not "represent"
them.98 When such a disclaimer is made, it may be argued that the
client was put on notice not to rely on this advice. There are, how-
ever, serious problems concerning the efficacy of such disclaimers. As
noted previously, because of economic concerns or a lack of under-
96. At least one commentator has argued that an attorney can avoid the duties of repre-
sentation by giving "legal information" rather than "legal advice." Under this view, the medi-
ator could provide general, abstract legal information and therefore not engage in the "prac-
tice of law." See Comment, supra note 55, at 1008-09. This theory "fails to recognize that
many subtle judgments often are required to explain applicable law, and further that 'legal
advice' often is meant to include advising a client of his options and the risks and benefits
associated with each while not telling him which to choose." New Standards, supra note 3, at
345-46 n.74.
97. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. See also Kane, Kane & Kritzer, Inc.
v. Altagen, 107 Cal. App.2d 36, 165 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1980).
98. Several bar opinions have made this a requirement of acting as a mediator. See
supra note 59. See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYER
MEDIATORS IN FAMILY DISPUTES (adopted August 8, 1984). Explanations of these standards
appear in Loeb, Introduction to the Standards of Practice for Family Mediators, 17 FAM.
LQ. 451, 453 (1984).
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standing,'9 the parties may choose to disregard the warning and re-
main unrepresented. The question then becomes whether these dis-
avowals effectively discharge the duties of representation. The
critical issue is whether the client is still likely to rely on the advice
of the mediator. In the mediation setting, it is highly likely that he
will. Since the attorney-mediator is the only source of legal advice,
any opinions of law coming from him will likely be accepted as accu-
rate and be relied upon by the client.
Since the clients are likely to rely on this advice, the disavowal
of representation should have no effect. To allow such disclaimers
would permit attorney-mediators to provide legal advice to unrepre-
sented parties without the legal obligations associated with represen-
tation. Such a rule would disregard the established public policy in
favor of imposing a duty of care in such situations. In fact, the effect
of the rule would be to allow attorneys to contract away their liabil-
ity while providing the services of a lawyer. Such activity is expressly
forbidden by Rule 1.8(h) of the Model Rules.' 0
If the clients obtain independent counsel, such a disclosure will
effectively limit the lawyer's duty and liability. Rule 1.8(h) clearly
distinguishes the situation in which the client is "independently rep-
resented." 101 In such situations, the independent counsel will protect
the interests of his client, so the policy reasons for prohibiting dis-
avowals are no longer applicable. The independent counsel will have
the duty of representation and the threat of reliance is negated. The
parties may seek the advice of their independent counselor regarding
any legal issues discussed. At a minimum, they will present the me-
diation agreement to their private counsel for consideration before
signing.
The remaining issue in this area is how an attorney-mediator
can be sure that the disputants have obtained independent counsel.
The answer is they can never be sure. Some mediators do not like
the presence of independent counsel during the mediation sessions
because they believe it creates an atmosphere of adversity that hin-
ders the process.' 0 2 In addition, to keep costs down, many disputants
consult attorneys only for an evaluation of the mediation agreement.
99. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
100. Rule 1.8(h) states: "A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting
the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is inde-
pendently represented in making the agreement . See MODEL RULES, supra note 48,
Rule 1.8(h).
101. Id.
102. Classnotes from lecture by Prof. P. Kutulakis in Alternate Dispute Resolution (Fall
semester 1987).
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Therefore, the attorney-mediator can only rely upon the assurances
of the parties that they have contacted or will contact independent
counsel. The proper test to determine the mediator's duties will then
be whether he "reasonably believes" the parties are independently
represented. 10 3 In those situations in which the disputants remain un-
represented despite assurances to the mediator, the attorney-client
relationship should not be applied. The disputant has assumed the
risk of proceeding without representation and cannot show any
reliance.
VII. Representing Conflicting Interests
When the single attorney-mediator has reason to believe that
the parties will not be consulting independent counsel, he should be
deemed as "representing" all the clients involved.04 Some commen-
tators'0 5 and bar opinions' 06 believe that this concept of representa-
tion is incompatible with the process of mediation.10 6 It is argued
that it is impossible for the attorney to live up to the ethical require-
ments of "representation" invoked while mediating between conflict-
ing interests.107 This argument is based on the misconception that
the only proper role of an attorney working within the Model Rules
is adversarial. 08
The representation of conflicting interests in other areas of law
is an accepted practice. Common examples of such representation
103. Riskin adopts a similar test for determining a neutral lawyer's liability for a viola-
tion of the "maximization standard."
A neutral lawyer who failed to tell the couple about the tax advantages of
alimony over child support . . . and instead concurred in their plans to make all
payments child support, probably would have breached his duty to help partici-
pants maximize assets - unless of course he reasonably believed that outside
counsel . . . would be consulted and would cover this matter . . . It should not
be enough for the neutral lawyer to show that he advised the couple to seek
outside experts, unless he had strong reason to think that they would do so and,
perhaps, some basis for predicting that the outside expert would be sufficiently
competent to suggest this technique.
New Standards, supra note 3, at 360 (emphasis added).
104. For a discussion of the terminology problems associated with mediation representa-
tion see Crouch, supra note 25, at 233-34.
105. See New Standards, supra note 3, at 342; Comment, supra note 55, at 989-90.
106. See supra note 59.
106. There is one bar opinion that allows attorneys to act as mediators, allows them to
provide legal advice, and applies a limited duty of representation. Oregon State Bar Legal
Ethics Op. 488 (1983) [hereinafter Oregon Op.].
107. "The idea of undivided loyalty to an individual client is inconsistent with the neu-
tral posture toward all the parties." New Standards, supra note 3, at 342.
108. "While acknowledging that lawyers sometimes act as advisors or intermediaries,
the rules impose a single set of ethical standards: those adapted to the adversary process."
Comment, supra note 55, at 992.
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include: the parties to a contract, 09 the parties to a real estate agree-
ment,"' the insured and insurer,"' and the parties to an uncontested
divorce." 2 In such situations, the Model Rules, and the fiduciary ob-
ligations emanating from them, provide guidance for the attorney
and standards of accountability for the protection of clients. " ' The
attorney-mediator representing conflicting interests should be held to
the same duties of care that are imposed on intermediaries in other
situations.
In Model Rule 1.7, it is established that an attorney can re-
present conflicting interests in certain situations."" Rule 2.2, how-
ever, sets forth the specific requirements for acting as an intermedi-
ary. The rule states:
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
(1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the
implications of the common representation, including
the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the
attorney-client privileges, and obtains each client's con-
sent to the common representation;
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can
be resolved on terms compatible with the clients' best
interests, that each client will be able to make ade-
quately informed decisions in the matter and that there
is little risk of material prejudice to the interest of any
of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuc-
cessful; and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common
representation can be undertaken impartially and with-
out improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer
has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with
each client concerning the decisions to be made and the consid-
eration relevant in making them, so that each client can make
adequately informed decisions.
109. In re Evans, 113 Ariz. 459, 556 P.2d 792 (1976); Craft Builders, Inc. v. Ellis D.
Taylor, Inc., - Del. -_, 254 A.2d 233 (1969); Crest Investment Trust, Inc. v. Comstock,
23 Md. App. 280, 327 A.2d 891 (1974).
l10. Beattie v. Firnschild, 152 Mich. App. 785, 394 N.W.2d 107 (1986); In re Dolan,
76 N.J. 1, 384 A.2d 1076 (1978).
Ill. Lysick v. Walcon, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968); Lieberman v.
Employers Ins., 84 N.J. 325, 419 A.2d 417 (1980).
112. Klemm v. Superior Court of Fresno County, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr.
509 (1977); Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
I 13. For a full discussion of conflict of interest situations, see Developments, supra note
71.
114. See MODEL RULES, supra note 48, Rule 1.7.
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(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients
so request, or if any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is
no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not con-
tinue to represent any of the clients in the matter that was the
subject of the intermediation."'
Based on these rules, and the rules preceding them in the Model
Code, case law has developed prerequisites for when an attorney can
represent conflicting interests and defined the duties applicable to
such representation.
A. Prerequisites for Representing Conflicting Interests
The lawyer's first step in a conflict of interest situation is to
determine whether he can adequately represent both parties. The
primary consideration is what type of conflict is involved. It is a well-
established rule that an attorney cannot represent parties who are in
"actual" conflict.116 Therefore, a lawyer will almost never be able to
perform dual representation in an adversarial proceeding such as a
trial or hearing. Such representation "would be inconsistent with the
adversary position of an attorney in litigation . ..where he could
not advocate the interests of one client without adversely injuring
those of the other."' 17 However, if the conflict is merely "potential"
and the lawyer believes "his independent judgment would not be ad-
versely affected," ' dual representation may be permitted. 1
A conflict would be potential as long as "the lawyer reasonably
believes that the matter can be resolved on terms compatible with
the client's best interests. '1 20 In the area of mediation, the conflict
between the two parties will very often be merely potential. The ra-
tionale behind mediation itself presupposes that there is no actual
115. Id., Rule 2.2.
116. An actual conflict has been described as "one in which the lawyer's independent
professional judgment will be adversely affected." Patterson, An Analysis of Conflicts of Inter-
est Problems, 37 MERCER L. REv. 569, 572 (1986) (emphasis in original).
117. Klemm v. Superior Court of Fresno County. 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 898, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 509, 512 (1977). Some proposals would allow neutral lawyers to represent both parties
before a court in connection with an undisputed divorce. See Crouch, supra note 25, at 249.
118. Patterson, supra note 117, at 572.
119. "The risk of a breach of the duty of undivided loyalty exists only when the interests
are hostile or adverse." R. MALLEN, supra note 78, § 99 at 149, see also The Florida Bar v.
Moore, 194 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1967).
120. MODEL RULES, supra note 48, Rule 2.2. Patterson defines a potential conflict as
"one in which the lawyer's independent professional judgment is likely to be adversely af-
fected." Patterson, supra note 117, at 572 (emphasis in original). This Comment adopts the
language of Rule 2.2 because its language identifies the proper consideration of the attorney-
mediator.
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conflict. The parties are using the services of an intermediary to find
a mutually fair agreement. The process is not a win-lose situation; it
is conceived of as a "win-win" situation.121 As one commentator
noted, "Mediation does not ordinarily begin with the notion that
there is a fixed pie that the parties must slice up. Instead, the idea is
that, by working cooperatively, they can enlarge the pie and perhaps
share an entire dinner." '22
If a dispute between the parties rises to the level of an actual
conflict and a mutually fair agreement becomes impossible or litiga-
tion becomes imminent, the attorney-mediator or one of the parties
could end the mediation. The disputants could obtain independent
counsel at that time. 23 Under paragraph (c) of Model Rule 2.2, the
attorney-mediator would be barred from representing either of the
disputants in any future action involving this dispute.12 4
When representing conflicting interests, the attorney's second
step is to obtain the consent of the parties after full disclosure of his
dual representation. 25
To satisfy the requirement of full disclosure by a lawyer
before undertaking to represent two conflicting interests, it is not
sufficient that both parties be informed of the fact that the law-
yer is undertaking to represent both of them, but he must ex-
plain to them the nature of the conflict of interest in such detail
that they understand the reasons why it may be desirable for
each to have independent counsel, with undivided loyalty to the
interests of each of them. 2 '
This is an important requirement for many acting attorney-
mediators who believe that informed consent is not necessary be-
cause they do not "represent the disputants. ' 27 Under the rules of
121. J. FOLBERG, supra note I1, at 10.
122. New Standards, supra note 3, at 358.
123. See Developments, supra note 71, at 1309-10 (conflict of interest situations).
124. MODEL RULES, supra notes 48, 116, Rule 2.2. In the case of In re Holmes, 290 Or.
173, 619 P.2d 1284 (1980), the court rejected a lawyer's claim that he had acted permissibly
as a mediator or arbitrator between two clients rather than representing conflicting multiple
interests. The court noted, however, that even if his undertaking was mediation within the
meaning of EC 5-20 of the Model Code, he acted contrary to this ethical consideration when
he later represented one of the clients in an action against the other that involved items that
were at least indirectly involved in the previous dispute. Id. at 178, 619 P.2d at 1289-90.
125. See, e.g., Klemm v. Superior Court of Fresno County, 75 Cal. App. 2d 893, 898,
142 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 (1977); Kelly v. Greason, 23 N.Y. 2d 368, 373, 244 N.E.2d 456, 460,
296 N.Y.S.2d 937, 943-44 (1968).
126. In re Boivin, 271 Or. 419, 424, 533 P.2d 171, 174 (1975).
127. Cf. Comment, supra note 55, at 1004 n. 132. The requirement "assumes ... that
the attorney is representing both parties rather than serving as an impartial advisor represent-
ing neither party. Where the mediator makes clear that she represents neither party, informed
consent to representation of conflicting interests is not relevant." Id.
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dual representation, however, failure to make such a disclosure may
in itself render an attorney liable for legal malpractice.12
8
B. Duties When Representing Conflicting Interests - Applied to
Mediation
When an attorney represents conflicting interests, all the fiduci-
ary duties associated with representation come into play - including
loyalty.129 As one court noted, "the loyalty he owes to one client can-
not consume that owed to the other."' 0 The duties, however, will not
be the same as those traditionally associated with the attorney as
advocate.
In the usual attorney-client situation, "[t]he attorney is under a
duty to represent the client with undivided loyalty, to preserve the
client's confidence and to disclose any material matters bearing upon
the representation of these obligations."'3s Such definitions of a law-
yer's duties, derived from the Model Rules, are designed for the at-
torney acting as an advocate.
When representing conflicting interests, an attorney's duties
should not be analyzed in terms of being an advocate; instead, his
duties should be measured in terms of being an intermediary. 2 In
the preamble to the Model Rules, the differences between these du-
ties'88 are clearly noted. "As advocate a lawyer zealously asserts the
client's position under the rules of the adversary system . . . as in-
termediary between clients, a lawyer seeks to reconcile their diver-
gent interests, and to a limited extent as a spokesperson for each
client."'' 3 Therefore, although the attorney-mediator will owe a duty
of loyalty to the disputants, it will be the loyalty of an intermediary.
To avoid any appearance of impropriety, the attorney-mediator
must include in his initial disclosure an explanation of "all facts and
circumstances which in the judgment of a lawyer of ordinary skill
and capacity, are necessary to make free and intelligent decisions
regarding the subject matter of the representation."' He must dis-
128. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
129. See Maryland Op., supra note 56.
130. Ishmael v. Milington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 524, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 596 (1966).
131. R. MALLEN, supra note 78, § 99 at 146.
132. Patterson, supra note 117, at 583.
133. There are important differences between these two processes. "Mediation empha-
sizes such values as mutuality, community, humanism, communication, individual responsibil-
ity and trust. The adversarial process separates the parties, subsumes the parties' responsibili-
ties, imposes a third party decision-maker, emphasizes legal rules as guides to fairness and
presents the lawyer as powerful and dominant." Pirie, supra note 5, at 404.
134. MODEL RULES, supra note 48, Preamble (emphasis added).
135. Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 528, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 597 (1966).
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close his inability to represent either of the parties in any form of
litigation136 and explain that his loyalty to both sides will be some-
what modified.1 37 He must also explain that "he must be free to re-
veal to each client all information relevant to the representation." '138
Complete disclosure of pertinent information will avoid ethical di-
lemmas about how much to reveal to a particular party"3 9 and will
also establish his role as a neutral.
This explanation of his limited representation, however, will not
remove his duty to represent both parties to the best of his ability. In
this respect, he must competently advise the parties of all the legal
issues involved.'l 0 He must try to establish and verify the legal rights
of both parties to the best of his ability. An example of the require-
ment to verify legal positions of opposing disputants is clearly shown
in the case of Ishmael v. Millington."" In that case, an attorney
represented both husband and wife in a divorce action. The attorney
advised the wife to sign a property settlement based on his belief
that she was getting half the property. In fact, she settled for $8,807
when her right to community assets totalled $82,500. In assessing
the duty of care for the attorney, the court stated:
Representing a wife in an arm's length divorce, an attorney
would demand some verification of the husband's financial state-
ment; or, at the minimum, inform the wife that the husband's
statement was unconfirmed . . . that prudence called for investi-
gation and verification. Deprived of such disclosure, the wife
cannot make a free and intelligent choice. Representing both
spouses in an uncontested divorce situation, .... the attorney's
professional obligations demand no less. 42
In the mediation setting, this duty of verification should fully
apply. When independent counsel is available, the mediator's role
would be to point out the need for verification. In the single media-
tion situation, however, the attorney-mediator should have the obli-
gation to verify the legal positions of both parties. Although it might
be difficult at times to accomplish verification while maintaining an
impression of neutrality, it can be accomplished if the mediator is
136. See Oregon Op., supra note 107.
137. Patterson, supra note 117, at 583.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Crest Investment Trust, Inc. v. Comstock, 23 Md. App. 280, 297, 327 A.2d
891, 906 (1974).
141. 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
142. Id. at 524, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
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open and frank about his duties and obligations. When the attorney-
mediator approaches the parties as a neutral advisor who places
equal demands upon each of them, the parties will understand that
he is fulfilling his proper role and not taking sides. When providing
legal advice in such situations, however, the attorney must be careful
to phrase his language in terms of what a court might do and what a
court is likely to consider.
At the conclusion of the mediation, the parties will sign an
agreement that will contain the provisions of their settlement. An
important issue is the mediator's responsibility for the terms of the
contract. An essential element of the mediation process is the respon-
sibility of the parties for any substantive decision or agreement. 1 3
Therefore, the attorney-mediator would have a duty to ensure the
legal fairness of the agreement, but he would not be responsible for
sanctioning the specific terms of the contract."' An excellent exam-
ple of the scope of the duty of fairness is provided in Klemm v. Su-
perior Court of Fresno County. 1 5 In Klemm, an attorney repre-
sented both husband and wife in a divorce settlement in which the
wife waived all child support. The court stated:
While on the face of the matter it may appear foolhardy for
the wife to waive child support, other values could very well
have been more important to her than such support - such as
maintaining a good relationship between the husband and the
children and herself despite the marital problems .... .
The court approved of the settlement and the representation by the
attorney as long as the attorney had made a full disclosure of all
facts and applicable principles of law. "
143. Pirie, supra note 5, at 383.
144. See Crest Investment Trust, Inc. v. Comstock, 23 Md. App. 280, 297, 327 A.2d
891, 906 (1974). For a similar duty that was placed on all mediators, see 0. COOGLER, STRUC-
TURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT 26-27 (1978). Coogler indicates that the media-
tor should refuse to concur in an agreement that "is manifestly not in keeping with the ethics
and legal responsibilities of the parties." 0. COOGLER, supra.
145. 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1977).
146. Id. at 898, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
147. "We hold on the facts of this case, wherein the conflict was only potential, that if
the written consents were knowing and informed and given full disclosure by the attorney, the
attorney can appear for both of the parties on issues concerning which they full agree. Id. at
899, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
See also Crest Investment Trust, Inc. v. Comstock, 23 Md. App. 280, 327 A.2d 891
(1974).
We deem it a truism . . . that persons sui juris may embrace contractual
unfairness in the exercise of business judgment and be bound by their bargain;
but in the context of this case, that result is compelled only if [the attorney]
made a full disclosure not only of all the facts but also of applicable principles of
law.
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The Klemm case evidences a settlement that was legally fair for
both husband and wife, yet, the attorney was not responsible for
sanctioning the provisions of the contract. One might ask what
would be the mediator's duty when parties intend to sign a contract
that is not legally fair. The appropriate answer is that the parties
will not sign such an agreement. The duty of the attorney is to fully
inform the parties of their legal rights and to advise them of the
implications of their agreement. By informing the parties that their
agreement is legally unsound, the party likely to be damaged will use
this information to negotiate a better settlement or refuse to sign.
The other party, in the spirit of compromise associated with media-
tion, will most likely endeavor to supply a more equitable agreement.
Therefore, by supplying complete legal advice, the parties will con-




The appropriate remedy for a client injured by an attorney-me-
diator who breaches his duty is recovery in a legal malpractice ac-
tion. Generally, in cases involving liability for malpractice based on
representation of conflicting interests, the courts have applied the
settled rules and principles governing legal malpractice actions. 49
The courts commonly require a plaintiff to prove that an attorney-
client relationship existed, that the attorney had a duty to the client,
that the attorney breached that duty, and that this breach of duty
was the proximate cause of damage to the client.'50 A cause of ac-
tion for "attorney-mediator" malpractice should require the same
proof.
A. The Attorney-Client Relationship
This Comment has already established the possible existence of
an attorney-client relationship in the "attorney-mediator" situa-
Id. at 297, 327 A.2d at 906.
148. In the extreme situation in which the parties do intend to sign an agreement that
falls below the standard of legally fair, the attorney-mediator should withdraw from the medi-
ation. He will know that "the matter can[not] be resolved on terms compatible with the cli-
ent's best interest." See MODEL RULES, supra note 48, Rule 2.2 (definition of potential con-
flict). Therefore, the potential conflict has become actual and continued representation is a
violation of his fiduciary obligations.
149. See Developments, supra note 71, at 1488. See also Ishmael v. Milington, 241 Cal.
App. 2d 520, 521, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 593 (1966).
150. Developments, supra note 71, at 1488.
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tion. 151 In a malpractice action, the plaintiff would have to prove
that the mediator provided legal advice upon which the disputant
might reasonably rely. 152 The attorney could refute this element by
showing that he reasonably believed that the client was indepen-
dently represented.15 3
B. Duty to the Client
It is well established that an attorney assumes a duty to the
client when he undertakes to provide legal advice. 54 The duty is de-
fined as using the skill and care that a reasonable attorney would
exercise under similar circumstances.15 5 The scope of the duty in me-
diation would require him to fully advise the clients of their respec-
tive rights and explain the legal consequences of signing the media-
tion agreement.1 56
C. Breach
The attorney-mediator may breach his duty to the disputants in
several ways. As previously noted, the attorney representing conflict-
ing interests has a duty to fully inform the clients about the exis-
tence of a conflict, its nature, and its effect upon the attorney's rep-
resentation.) 7 The failure to make such a disclosure may in itself
render an attorney liable for legal malpractice. 58 However, even full
disclosure will "not avoid the effect of a conflict which precludes
competent representation."' 59 An attorney-mediator would breach
his fiduciary obligations if he ran a mediation to its conclusion know-
ing that the matter cannot "be resolved on terms compatible with
the client's best interest."' 60 Such action would constitute represen-
tation of parties in actual conflict and thus violate the Model Rules.
The negligence of the attorney-mediator in his dual representa-
tion would also constitute a breach of duty. 6' The failure to provide
legal advice with the skill and care that a reasonable attorney would
exercise under the circumstances should render the attorney-media-
151. See supra notes 72-97 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
155. See Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 521, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
156. See supra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 126-27, 136-40 and accompanying text.
158. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 145, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 414 (1968).
159. R. MALLEN, supra note 78, § 99 at 150.
160. See MODEL RULES, supra notes 48, 121, Rule 2.2 (defining potential conflicts).
161. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
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tor liable for malpractice.
D. Damages
Recovery in conflict of interest cases has been "limited by the
requirement that a plaintiff prove actual harm resulting from the
attorney's breach of duty."' 2 The situation is no different in the "at-
torney-mediator" setting. The disputant would have to show that he
relied upon the advice given during mediation and as a direct and
proximate result of this advice he suffered loss or damage.16 3 In
Lange v. Marshall,'64 the only reported case in which a mediator
was sued for malpractice, the Missouri Court of Appeals assumed
the negligence of the defendant but denied recovery without suffi-
cient proof of damages proximately resulting from the alleged
breach.
165
In Lange, a husband and wife seeking a divorce approached an
attorney who undertook the mediation of a divorce settlement. After
signing a settlement agreement, which was pending before a judge
for approval, Mrs. Lange had second thoughts about the settle-
ment.' 68 Accordingly, she obtained independent counsel who eventu-
ally obtained a more favorable divorce settlement for her. Mrs.
Lange sued the mediator claiming he was negligent in not inquiring
further as to the financial worth of her former husband, failing to
help her negotiate a better settlement, not advising her she could get
more if she litigated the matter, and not fully disclosing her rights as
to marital property, custody, and maintenance. 67 The defendant
asserted:
* that because he undertook to represent the parties as a
mediator, a status disclosed fully to both parties, that he felt it
would be improper for him to do any of the four things claimed
to be negligence as it would place him in the position of an ad-
vocate for one party or the other.'
6 8
The case went to a jury that returned a verdict against the mediator
162. Developments, supra note 71, at 1490. The injured party will have a much easier
time obtaining rescission of the contract. See. e.g., Crest Investment Trust, Inc. v. Comstock,
23 Md. App. 280, 327 A.2d 891 (1974).
163. See Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 526, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 597-98
(1966).
164. 622 S.W. 2d 237 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
165. Id. at 239.




in the amount of $74,000.00.1"9
On appeal, the court refused to resolve the exact nature of the
defendant's status or the duties imposed upon him.170 The court as-
sumed for the purposes of its opinion that the mediator owed a duty
to the participants and that this duty was breached. The court held,
however, that there could be no recovery for negligence without
proof of damages proximately resulting from the alleged breach.
17 '
The appellate court found that the plaintiff's claim that her husband
would have agreed to a better settlement if the defendant had ful-
filled his duties was merely speculative. Therefore, there was no evi-
dence that the expenses she incurred after she obtained her own law-
yer would not have been incurred anyway. 7
The Lange case evidences the difficulty that may be encountered
in proving negligence on the part of an attorney-mediator. However,
the difficulty is not insurmountable. In fact, when the attorney-medi-
ator allows the parties to sign an agreement that is legally unfair and
they conform to its requirements for any length of time, the associ-
ated damages should be substantially less difficult to prove. In Ish-
mael v. Millington,173 the attorney was found negligent in failing to
verify the husband's financial statement and causing the wife's sur-
render of her right to almost $74,000.00 in community assets. On
the issue of damages, the court left the decision for the jury, but
noted that it was "not at all inconsistent with the claim that her loss
was the result of the attorney's negligent failure.' ' 4 The only obsta-
cle to recovery in this case was the possibility of contributory negli-
gence. The court noted that a finding of contributory negligence
would bar malpractice recovery.' 75 This issue, however, was also left
to the jury because "a court . . . cannot say that reasonable jurors
would inevitably characterize her conduct as contributory
negligence.'
' 7
Therefore, although proof of damages may be a difficult hurdle
in some attorney-mediator negligence suits, it is not an insurmounta-
ble problem. The requirement of establishing damages is the same as
169. Id. at 237.
170. Id. at 238. The Court found it unnecessary to decide this issue, but it did note that
'mediator' would appear to be the proper term to apply to the defendant's role." Id. at 238
n.2.
171. Id. at 239.
172. Id.
173. 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
174. Id. at 527, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
175. Id. at 528, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
176. Id.
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in any other type of legal malpractice case.
IX. The Effect of Independent Counsel
In those situations when the attorney-mediator reasonably be-
lieves that the disputants have obtained independent counsel, the pol-
icy arguments in favor of representation no longer apply. When the
parties have the advice of independent counsel, there is no longer
any threat that they will rely upon the legal advice provided by the
mediator. In such cases, it would be the duty of the independent
counsel to protect the interests of the parties involved.
In these situations, the attorney is properly classified as not
"representing" the parties. Therefore, the duties and obligations em-
anating from the Model Rules would not apply. The comment to
Rule 2.2 specifically states the following:
The Rule does not apply to a lawyer acting . . . as media-
tor between or among parties who are not clients of the lawyer,
even where the lawyer has been appointed with the concurrence
of the parties. In performing such a role the lawyer may be sub-
ject to applicable codes of ethics .... "'
This comment places the impartial advisory attorney outside the
scope of the Model Rules, and removes all the ethical obligations of
the attorney-client relationship. In effect, the attorney acting as a
mediator is on the same footing as lay mediators. Such attorneys,
however, may be subject to other "applicable codes of ethics." '78 At
this point in time, no comprehensive code for the practice of media-
tion has been developed. In light of this, several commentators have
proposed theories of accountability for the mediation process. 7
There are, however, problems associated with any comprehensive
theory at this stage in the growth of mediation because "there is
little agreement as to what a reasonably competent mediator should
do . . ..
An analysis to determine the proper theory of accountability is
beyond the scope of this Comment. There is, however, a growing
consensus among mediation theorists concerning the minimum stan-
dards of a competent mediator - impartiality, fairness, and thor-
oughness - that deserve comment.
177. MODEL RULES, supra note 48, Rule 2.2 comment.
178. Id.
179. See Chaykin, supra note 5; Note, The Sultans of Swap: Defining the Duties and
Liabilities of American Mediators, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1876 (1986).
180. Chaykin, supra note 5, at 736.
THE ATTORNEY MEDIATOR
A. Impartiality
"All mediation theorists agree that the mediator is to be 'impar-
tial,' but the substance of that duty of impartiality is difficult to de-
fine." 18' At a minimum, the duty demands that mediators refrain
from becoming a representative or advocate for one of the parties.18
"In the event that the mediator violates a client's trust by behaving
in a biased manner, it may be argued that the essential purpose of
the relationship has been subverted and left unfulfilled."
B. Fairness
Fairness between the parties is another well-recognized standard
for mediators.
The neutral [mediator] . . . should have a duty to assist
participants toward an agreement and through a process, that 1)
meets the participants' own sense of fairness; 2) does not violate
minimal societal notions of fairness between persons who make
agreements; and 3) does not violate minimal standards of fair-
ness toward unrepresented third parties. 8"
C. Thoroughness
A third important requirement is the duty to help disputants
thoroughly analyze their conflict. 85 This may include "enlarg[ing]
the number of issues''186 or "actually seek[ing] to discover underly-
ing causes of precipitating disputes." 87 The object of mediation is an
analysis of the parties' true interests and goals that will lead to a
thorough and final resolution of the conflict.
X. Conclusion
Mediation is spreading rapidly across the United States and is
becoming an increasingly popular form of nonlitigative dispute reso-
lution. As mediation continues to grow, so too will its impact on the
rights of participants in the process. With this increasing growth of
influence, it is widely accepted that there is a need for defining the
181. Note, supra note 180, at 1888.
182. Pirie, supra note 5, at 382.
183. Chaykin, supra note 5, at 749.
184. New Standards, supra note 3, at 354.
185. See New Standards, supra note 3, at 358 ("maximization"); Note, supra note 180,
at 1890-91 ("thoroughness").
186. New Standards, supra note 3, at 359.
187. Note, supra note 180, at 1891.
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legal obligations and liabilities of mediators.
Defining the duties of attorneys acting as mediators is of partic-
ular importance. Attorneys acting in this capacity provide legal ad-
vice to the disputants upon which they may rely in forming their
mediation agreement. Public policy demands that some form of pro-
tection be provided to insure that parties are not foregoing otherwise
legally enforceable rights based upon inadequate advice.
When the disputants to a mediation are represented by indepen-
dent counsel the threat of reliance on the mediator's legal advice is
negated. The private counsel will have a duty to protect the legal
interests of the parties. When mediation is conducted without the
protection of independent counsel, however, the threat of reliance on
the attorney-mediator's advice is great. Therefore, in the interest of
protecting the parties to mediation, the single "attorney-mediator"
should be deemed to "represent" the disputants and be held to a
standard of care appropriate for this type of attorney-client
relationship.
Michael Zipfel
